The medieval church had always been concerned about superstition. In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries-the waning years, as some would have it, of the European Middle Ages-certain theologians and other clerical authorities became obsessed with it. Authors from Iberia to the Low Countries and from Paris to Vienna turned their attention to this topic, and particularly in the first half of the 1400s a wave of tracts and treatises explicitly de superstitionibus issued from their pens. For these men, superstition was a serious error, not the typically harmless foolishness that modern use of the term tends to convey. In the theology of the age, superstitio meant most basically an excess of religion, literally "religion observed beyond proper measure. " Since human beings could not possibly offer a superabundance of proper worship beyond what God, in his perfection, de-served, this excess necessarily implied improper religious rites and observances. Superstition meant either performing elements of the divine cult incorrectly or, worse still, offering worship to entities other than the Deity.
A Late-Medieval Crisis of Superstition? By Michael D. Bailey I he medieval church had always been concerned about superstition. In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries-the waning years, as some would have it, of the European Middle Ages-certain theologians and other clerical authorities became obsessed with it. Authors from Iberia to the Low Countries and from Paris to Vienna turned their attention to this topic, and particularly in the first half of the 1400s a wave of tracts and treatises explicitly de superstitionibus issued from their pens. 1 For these men, superstition was a serious error, not the typically harmless foolishness that modern use of the term tends to convey. 2 In the theology of the age, superstitio meant most basically an excess of religion, literally "religion observed beyond proper measure." 3 Since human beings could not possibly offer a superabundance of proper worship beyond what God, in his perfection, deserved, this excess necessarily implied improper religious rites and observances. Superstition meant either performing elements of the divine cult incorrectly or, worse still, offering worship to entities other than the Deity. 4 Such sweeping definitions could encompass a multitude of practices, and had done so in the long course of Christian history. 5 For the authors of the early This article was largely written during a semester at the Monumenta Germaniae Historica. For providing an unparalleled working environment and access to unmatched resources, I thank the MGH and the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek. For financial support, I am grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. An early version of the article was presented at the University of Mannheim, and my thanks go to PD Dr. Sabine von Heusinger for the opportunity to speak there. A later version was presented at the Newberry Library Medieval Intellectual History Colloquium, and I thank the organizers and participants for many useful suggestions. Finally, I thank the anonymous readers for Speculum, whose comments greatly improved the clarity and style of this article. fifteenth century, concern over superstition tended to focus on common spells, charms, methods of divination (including both relatively simple means of fortunetelling and learned, systematic astrology), and other more or less magical practices. In the post-Enlightenment world of the modern West, and certainly in most elite, educated discourse, all aspects of magic are typically dismissed as ineffectual and irrational, completely disconnected from the scientific principles by which the universe is understood to operate. 6 For medieval authorities, of course, the situation was profoundly different. While they might judge some spells or charms to be "vain" or ineffectual, they considered most such practices to be fully in accord with understood systems of causation and capable of producing very real results, albeit by corrupted means. Their concerns, therefore, were very real indeed. Chief among them were fears that demonic power lurked behind erroneous practices and that such rites might mask the adoration or veneration of wicked spirits. 7 Concern over superstition was rising already in the later fourteenth century, culminating in 1398, when the theological faculty of the university at Paris issued a decree condemning twenty-eight articles of magical arts and sorcery. 8 Yet the Paris decree dealt mainly with elite magical rites, whereas later works on superstition would typically include common practices as well. Concern seems to have radiated out from Paris, as Jean Gerson, the influential chancellor of the university, produced a half-dozen brief works criticizing various forms of superstition and magic. 9 To the first of these, De erroribus circa artem magicam (1402), he appended the list of the 1398 condemnations, which he had helped orchestrate. 10 He was followed by the Heidelberg theologian Nikolaus Magni of Jauer, who wrote a major treatise on superstition in 1405, himself inspired by a case brought before the Heidelberg theological faculty. 11 That same year, another Heidelberg theologian, Johannes of Frankfurt, produced a quaestio about whether demons could be compelled or controlled by certain words, figures, or written characters. 12 This addressed a central issue in authorities' debates over superstition, for if demons could be commanded by various rites, rather than supplicated and venerated, then the exploitation of their power might not entail superstitious error.
Over the next few decades, a steady stream of works appeared, mainly in central Europe. Around 1415 an anonymous author, perhaps a theologian from Cologne, wrote against superstitious divination. 13 A decade after that, the Cologne theologian Heinrich of Gorcum (modern Gorichem, in the Netherlands) produced a short tract on superstition. 14 Also around this time, probably in 1423, the Vienna theologian Nikolaus of Dinkelsbuhl dealt with superstition in a series of sermons on the Ten Commandments: since, authorities believed, superstitious practices so frequently entailed diabolism, they clearly fell under the first commandment's ban against idolatry. 15 developed in the course of the fifteenth century, for which these slightly earlier and then contemporary critics of superstition are often seen as precursors. 22 Martin of Aries, for example, demonstrates great concern over witchcraft, and he uses the label maleficium as often as he does superstitio. Heavily reliant on the earlier author Johannes Nider, Martin draws as much from Nider's Formicarius, a seminal treatise on witchcraft, as from the more general discussion of magic and superstition in Nider's Decalogue commentary. Still, Martin remains more a "superstition" than a "witchcraft" author because, even when discussing maleficium, he remains focused on the improper or misunderstood nature of particular magical rites rather than recounting gruesome stories of demonic sabbaths or other extravagant aspects of diabolism that authorities increasingly associated with witchcraft. I do not intend here to focus at length on the complex relationship between superstition and witchcraft discourse in the fifteenth century. The clear existence of that relationship, however, is relevant to my larger point.
Rising anxiety on the part of clerical authorities and an increased drive to scrutinize and control common beliefs and practices, growing fear of the devil and demonic operations in the world, the first sparks of witch-hunting: these seem very much the hallmarks of crisis in late-medieval religious culture, evidence of forms of thought declining into senility. 23 But was that really the case? The image of the decrepit late Middle Ages painted so evocatively by Johan Huizinga (and in less resplendent colors by others) remains powerful, despite numerous scholars' efforts to subvert it. 24 It also seems readily apparent for an age bracketed by plague and schism on one end and religious reformation on the other. Yet while fifteenthcentury authors certainly knew the crises their world had weathered, they had no conception of the tumults to come. Here I want to examine criticism of superstition in the early fifteenth century on its own terms, to see whether it indeed provides evidence of some crisis.
Since superstition was such a long-standing issue among Christian authorities, reaching back to the very earliest days of the church, we must first examine the long tradition of Christian discourse on superstition and how fifteenth-century writers related to it. While basic rhetoric about superstition could appear stable and even self-perpetuating, authors always deployed that rhetoric with an eye toward contemporary contexts. Fifteenth-century treatises presented superstition as a growing problem, a conviction that would seem to be grounded in the church's increasing pastoral and catechetical efforts among the laity in this period. Yet authorities did not regard superstition, even at this greater level of intensity, as a fundamentally new threat or crisis. Next we will explore the issues and anx- ieties at the heart of fifteenth-century concerns. Conditioned by the Scholastic theology and natural philosophy of preceding centuries, authors had to consider the potential demonic, divine, and natural operations that might be implicated in certain rites. Their fear that common people would not understand the important distinctions they drew between those operations masked the fact that they themselves often came to different conclusions on particular points. Their concerns, therefore, give evidence of an intellectual structure beginning to strain under the pressure of its own complexities but which, importantly, is not yet seen to be exhausted or breaking down. While authorities might disagree on some details, their faith in their basic understanding of the world was not shaken. If their system of thought was in crisis, they did not perceive it. Finally we must step back from the sources and examine the context of broader intellectual and religious developments in the fifteenth century, in order to see whether, regardless of authorities' own perceptions, their criticisms of superstition emerged within, or are indicative of, some more generalized crisis in this era. Here I will show, by way of conclusion, how the issue of superstition might better fit, and perhaps slightly modify, the periodization of an "Old Europe" enduring, despite dynamic changes, down to the eighteenth century, rather than that of a "late" medieval period declining toward its end around 1500.
SUPERSTITIONS OLD AND NEW
Superstition was not a new concept in the fifteenth century. The idea, and the term, had originated in antiquity, generally pertaining to excessive or improper devotional or divinatory practices. 25 As Christianity gained ascendance in the late Roman world, Christian writers declared that all pagan rites, insofar as they were directed toward Christian demons only masquerading as pagan deities, were improper, misinformed, and hence superstitious. 26 In the early fifth century, Augustine included "consultation and pacts with demons" in his influential list of superstitious practices. 27 Two centuries later, Isidore of Seville returned somewhat to Roman usages, citing Lucretius and Cicero while defining superstitio as excessive or "superfluous" religious observances. Yet he also emphasized the inevitable involvement of demons ("evil angels") in the magical arts. 28 Later Christian writers reproduced the definitions and the descriptions of superstition presented by those early authorities, creating to some degree a self-perpetuating rhetoric of 25 superstition across the early Middle Ages. 29 So powerful was this literary tradition that considerable doubt hangs over the degree to which sources discussing superstition in the seventh, eighth, or ninth centuries describe contemporary practices. 30 Yet authorities' discourse on superstition, whatever enduring elements it contained, surely also reflected some aspects of real practice, as well as authorities' own often subtle reworkings of inherited tradition. 31 These tendencies continued to be manifest in later periods.
As good Scholastics, the authors of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries who dealt with superstition were committed to the authority of the great names of the past. One of the few scholars to examine in depth even a portion of the sources focusing on superstition in this period, Karin Baumann, has concluded that fourteenth-and fifteenth-century church authorities regarded superstition as an essentially "a-historical phenomenon" that had been fully described already by patristic and early-medieval authors. 32 Thus they followed those sources whenever possible, drawing on early Christian and even Old Testament accounts of pagan superstition for much of their rhetoric. 33 Of course, a relatively stable rhetoric of criticism can nevertheless mask important changes in the use of terms and nuances of meaning. These men wrote in and for their own era, and Baumann correctly concludes that, however heavily the weight of past authority may have lain on fourteenth-and fifteenth-century writers, they also reflected contemporary practices to a considerable degree in their works. 34 The issue, then, is how to understand their use of earlier authority and the new concerns with which they enlivened old debates.
There is no doubt that, especially at first glance, tracts and treatises on superstition produced in the fifteenth century seem homages to past opinion. Thomas Aquinas was a towering authority to whom all later authors adhered, especially for basic definitions. 35 They also drew heavily on another leading thirteenth- 29 Harmening, Superstitio, pp. 49-75, notes with special reference the influence of the early-sixthcentury author Caesarius of Aries. 30 The strongest argument against widespread, persistent paganism in the early-medieval period is provided by Yitzhak Hen, Culture and Religion in Merovingian Gaul, A.D. 481 -751, Cultures, Beliefs, and Traditons 1 (Leiden, 1995), pp. 37 he might have been referring to one of two different works by that title produced in the early fifteenth century, one by the Leipzig professor Johannes of Wiinschelburg, the other an anonymous treatise De superstitionibus that exists in at least four copies in the Bavarian State Library in Munich, both of which are patterned heavily on William's work. 38 Beyond thirteenth-century Scholastics, and in many cases via those authors, authorities writing on superstition in the fifteenth century also drew on the older patristic and early-medieval literature that had established Christianity's basic understanding of the issue. Augustine appears as frequently as Aquinas in fifteenthcentury texts. In fact, as concern over superstition mounted in this period, an intriguing manuscript shows how some clerics turned very directly to the literature of the past. The codex in question dates from the fifteenth century and originally belonged to the Augustinian Hermits in Munich. Toward the end of a manuscript that consists mainly of sermons of Franciscus Mayronis (1288-1328), a Franciscan theologian active in Paris, are a few folios dedicated to superstition. The library catalog labels this anonymous work simply as Tractatus de superstitionibus, magia, sortilegiis, etc. 39 In fact, it is a collection of excerpts from a number 37 "Magister quidam in Tractatu suo de superstitionibus, quem pro magna parte ex libro domini Guilielmi Parrhisiensis de fide et legibus collegit": Denis the Carthusian, Contra vitia superstitionum, p. 610. 38 Anonymous, Tractatus de superstitionibus, Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 4707, fols. lr-70v; Clm 4727, fols. lr-78r; Clm 18257, fols. 5r-52v; and Clm 26923, fols. lr-67r. The treatise clearly comes from German-speaking lands, as the author includes a vernacular German charm to be recited under a new moon (Clm 4727, fol. 49r), and it must have been written in the first half of the fifteenth century. As a terminus post quem, the author cites Heinrich of Langenstein (d. 1397, Clm 4727, fol. 42r). As a terminus ante quem, probably the earliest of the Munich copies, Clm 26923, was likely copied in 1450. The copying of De superstitionibus is not dated in that codex, but the next work, following immediately after De superstitionibus, written in the same hand, and very likely copied in sequence, is a Tractatus de latria et dulia (Clm 26923, fols. 67v-96v), the explicit of which indicates that it was copied in that year. Much of the treatise is explicitly based on William of early sources. The (presumably) Augustinian scribe drew primarily on the namesake of his order, in particular quoting the essential passage from Augustine's De doctrina Christiana in which the bishop of Hippo defined superstition but also quoting from Augustine's De divinatione daemonum, the addendum to De divinatione daemonum that Augustine included in his Retractationes, and a letter from Augustine to Publicola. 40 Also included were Isidore of Seville's definitions of superstition from his Etymologiae and his long section devoted to magia. 4i The most "modern" work quoted was the ninth-century canon Episcopi (which medieval authors attributed to the fourth-century Council of Ancyra), discussing the "superstition" of women who believed that they flew at night with the goddess Diana. 42 This little tract is hardly an intellectual tour de force. Not only does it consist almost entirely of quotations, but the scribe managed to bungle a number of them in minor ways (or he worked from faulty copies). To his eternal shame as an Augustinian, he mislabeled Augustine's fundamental definition of superstition in De doctrina Christiana 2.20 as found "libro primo" of the work. 43 He was also not especially well informed about his topic. He clearly knew no Greek and did not understand the Greek root of "necromancy," or divination by means of the dead. 44 Also, the collection of excerpts is incomplete. It has no prologue, introductory opening, or even title. It begins in medias res with a citation from Augustine (the incipit, such as it is, is simply: "Item libro primo de doctrina Christiana . ..") and breaks off at the end of a page in the middle of a sentence. 45 Yet for all its imperfect and unfinished character, it shows that a cleric in the fifteenth century had grown interested enough in superstition to begin assembling a handbook of important early sources on the topic, probably as a reference work for others seeking basic definitions or writing on the topic themselves.
Reliant on past authority, the fifteenth century did not develop any new definition or dramatically new understanding of superstition. As Baumann notes, authors in this period considered the essential nature of superstition to be the same as that confronted by the early church fathers. Significantly different, however, were the level and the nature of interest the topic now attracted. In antiquity, while superstition had been a major issue, in many ways essential to Christianity's own definition of itself, it had never been an overriding focus of Christian writing. 46 Discussions of superstition were typically found as elements within other, more expansive works: Augustine's De doctrina Christiana, Caesarius of Aries's wide-ranging sermons, or Isidore of Seville's universal Etymologiae. 47 The same is true of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. During this period the church became increasingly involved in the quotidian religious practices of the laity through mechanisms as diverse as parish clergy, sacramental confession, and inquisition. Yet when learned authorities addressed superstition, they tended to deal with the issue as a theological abstraction or in relation to the suspected errors of other learned elites, such as the magical rites of clerical necromancers. 48 Concern over superstition had not yet peaked or reached its broadest extent. A score of tracts and treatises spread out over the first half of the fifteenth century do not necessarily mark concern over superstition as a defining characteristic of that period either, but they do show that for the first time a number of authors chose to write exclusively about this topic. Moreover, the issue figured prominently in one very characteristic genre of this age, being discussed as a form of idolatry in treatises on the Decalogue. 49 Decalogue commentaries were a primarily pastoral genre, and they reflect the growing concern of ecclesiastical authorities regarding superstition in lay belief and instruction.
Along these catechetical lines, and also very much in the spirit of the times, fifteenth-century authors addressed the issue of superstition less as an abstract theological point and more as a practical problem to be confronted and corrected. 50 Even broad, theoretical works were frequently motivated by particular concerns. Possibly the most widely circulated fifteenth-century treatise on super- 46 stition was that of Nikolaus of Jauer. 51 This large work dealt with numerous aspects of superstition, yet it seems to have been motivated by a specific case of error, not by some uninformed layperson but by a theologically trained cleric. Implications for lay instruction, however, are evident throughout the case. In early 1405, the year Nikolaus wrote his treatise, the Heidelberg theological faculty had questioned the Augustinian friar Werner of Friedberg about various superstitious positions he supposedly held, some of which clearly derived from or reflected common practices. 52 Werner was censured not only for using a vernacular healing charm himself but also for failing to reprimand any laity who confessed using similar rites. As always, at issue were both the nature of the practice and the need to police proper understanding.
Nikolaus wrote the official refutation of Werner's errors, and this exercise may have inspired his much larger treatise, in which he addressed issues of practice and understanding in more general ways. 53 Of course, such a connection is not necessary. Superstition was also being discussed in other contexts at Heidelberg at this time. Even as Werner's questioning was under way, another member of the theological faculty, Johannes of Frankfurt, conducted an academic dispute on whether certain words, figures, or characters could command and control demons, a central issue in authorities' categorizations of acts as superstition. 54 One could just as easily assume that Nikolaus of Jauer was already working on the topic of superstition and for that reason was chosen to refute Werner of Friedberg's positions. Either way, however, the relationship between Nikolaus of Jauer's treatise and the case of Werner of Friedberg shows the close connection between fifteenthcentury writing on superstition and particular events. 51 Staatsbiblothek, Clm 15320, fol. 155r ("Hec questio fuit in disputacione de quolibet heydelberge determinata Anno domini 1406 nona die januarii per magistrum Iohannem de Frankfordia sacre theologie bad.") as "1412." He was then followed by Hansen, Quellen, p. 71, in his edition of this work. Dorothea Walz (above, n. 12) has examined this misreading and further argues that 1406 must be a scribal error for 1405, thereby placing the disputation in the same month (January 1405) as Werner's trial.
Other authors also reflect this sense of immediate concern. Heinrich of Gorcum, writing around 1425, announced at the outset of his treatise that he intended to respond to "cases [of superstition] presented to me" and proceeded to address nine examples. 55 Martin of Aries, writing much later in the century, composed his general work on superstition in response to a single questionable event. In times of drought the local clergy of a village near Pamplona would perform a ceremony that involved saying masses over an image of St. Peter, baptizing it, and holding a procession. All this was intended to bring rain. Martin wrote in response to "a certain archdeacon" who asked whether this was a legitimate rite or a condemned superstition. 56 Denis the Carthusian wrote probably around the middle of the century and, while he mentioned no specific example, was likely inspired by similar cases. He stated that his short work should serve as a guide for local pastors so that they could prevent their flocks (and doubtless themselves as well) from falling into superstitious error. 57 Rather different in social context, but still a clear example of a treatise written for a specific purpose, was the German courtier Johannes Hartlieb's 1456 tract, Buch aller verbotenen Kiinste, des Aberglaubens und der Zauberei. Written at the request of Duke Albrecht II of Bavaria, Hartlieb's work deals more with learned courtly magic than common spells and charms, though it makes some mention of common magic and witchcraft. 58 However timeless superstition could seem in its essential nature, many authors clearly felt it was becoming more pressing and problematic in their time. Jean Gerson explicitly lamented at the beginning of De erroribus circa artem magicam that superstitious observances were growing ever more prevalent. 59 Denis the Carthusian exhibits a similar attitude. His Contra vitia superstitionum drew extensively on William of Auvergne's De legibus. 60 Yet Denis recognized that the particular needs of his age called for a more readily usable summary of that sprawling thirteenth-century work, one that could be used to combat growing superstition among the laity. His stated intent was to expound on his topic "briefly, plainly, and simply" as a guide to low-ranking parish clergy who would be in regular contact with common people and would need to police their practices. 61 In perhaps the most evocative description of the perceived degradation of present days, Nikolaus of Jauer compared the strong predilection of contemporary Christians for superstition to that of the ancient Jews for succumbing to idolatry and worshiping false gods. 62 55 Heinrich of Gorcum, De superstitiosis quibusdam casibus, fol. lr. 56 Martin of Aries, De superstitionibus, fols. lr-2r. 57 Denis the C a r t h u s i a n , Contra vitia superstitionum, p . 5 9 9 : " . . . praesertim q u a m laici q u i d a m ex ignorantia multipliciter hie offendunt; qui quamuis idola non adorant, tamen in modo colendi deum grauiter errant. Pertinetque ad pastores vt illos corripiant, corrigant et informant." 58 Johannes Hartlieb, Das Buch aller verbotenen Kiinste, des Aberglaubens und der Zauberei, ed. and trans. Falk Eisermann and Eckhard Graf, Esoterik des Abendlandes 4 (Ahlerstedt, Ger., 1989). 59 Gerson, De erroribus, p. 77: "observationes nostra, pro nefas, tempestate nimis et nimis invalescentes." 60 Probably directly, but also explicitly through another fifteenth-century treatise modeled on William's work, as above, n. 37. 61 Denis the Carthusian, Contra vitia superstitionum, p. 599: "breue, plane atque simpliciter." 62 Nikolaus of Jauer, De superstitionibus, fol. 44r.
Despite the clear sense that superstition had grown particularly threatening, only one of these authors made any specific argument for why this should be so: Martin of Aries noted the presence of many "new Christians" in Iberia, that is, converted Jews and Muslims, and attributed the spread of superstition to them. 63 Moreover, while all authors cited ancient authorities and clearly perceived superstition as in some sense perennial, only one writer, Heinrich of Gorcum, asserted specifically that some superstitions, such as belief in the so-called Egyptian days as a time of particular misfortune, were the unchanged manifestations of ancient paganism. 64 These men had a sense of history and certainly recognized that superstitions changed over time, even as they held that essential errors remained constant. A new vitality infused this old issue in the fifteenth century, but not in ways that astonished authorities or called for extended explanation. The church had confronted superstition in the past, and now was simply another moment when it needed to do so again. What remains to be asked is whether in this particular confrontation, in the concerns it generated and the responses it invoked, the authorities who wrote on superstition perceived any kind of crisis.
AUTHORITIES' ANXIETIES
The concerns clustering around the issue of superstition were, for authorities, as much about ensuring proper understanding of the various forces that infused the created world as about policing proper use of powerful rites. In many cases improper understanding is what rendered a practice inappropriate. Any involvement with demonic power was of course reprehensible-or rather, almost any, for the faithful could sometimes compel the devil by the power of Christ. Prayer, blessings, and items consecrated by the church all exerted power, yet that power had to be correctly understood lest a legitimate rite become corrupt and superstitious. In addition, various natural, though often occult, forces suffused the world, presenting a legitimate resource on which the faithful might draw but also a means by which demons could lead the unwary astray. 65 As authorities articulated their anxieties about all potential areas of superstitious error, they were, in fact, mapping a topography of both spiritual and natural power. The general contours of that map were widely agreed upon, but many of the more exact details were troubling, and often authors disagreed among themselves on precisely where important boundary lines should be drawn.
Authorities were in full agreement about the main danger entailed in superstition: the likely involvement of demons. Heinrich of Gorcum warned at the outset of his short tract of the terrible sin into which people would fall if they sought the "aid or counsel" of demons. 66 This was hardly a startling position, as it was grounded firmly in authorities stretching from Augustine to Aquinas. 67 Other fifteenth-century authors followed suit, declaring the threat of idolatry to be the greatest danger inherent in superstition. 68 That the idolatrous worship of demons was sinful could hardly be doubted, although in good Scholastic fashion many authors set about proving it at some length. 69 Most common spells and charms, however, did not contain explicit elements of demonic invocation or worship. In these cases, authors (again following established authority) assumed a tacit pact binding the human spell caster to a demon. 70 Yet since tacit pacts, by definition, left no overt evidence of demonic involvement, authorities felt compelled to prove that demons were, or at least could be, involved in the operations that spells or other superstitious rites were supposed to bring about.
Fifteenth-century authors writing on superstition devoted a great deal of their energy to demonstrating the possibility and range of demonic power. Nikolaus of Jauer dedicated more than the first third of his long work to this topic. 71 Jean Gerson's De erroribus circa artem magicam was much shorter but with an even greater proportion-close to half the original material in the tract-devoted to questions of demonic existence and power. 72 Jakob of Paradise framed his entire discussion of spells and superstitions in terms of demonic abilities. 73 Even with rites that supposedly involved the explicit invocation of demons, authorities felt the need to argue at some length that these were improper and superstitious. 74 In fact, the sources on which these men drew did create grounds for debate. The 67 Heinrich announced (ibid.) that he intended to draw mainly on Augustine, City of God 21, and Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2.2.95-97. 68 71 Nikolaus of Jauer, De superstitionibus, fols. 35r-46r (out of a total of twenty-nine folios in this copy). 72 Gerson, De erroribus, pp. 78-81 (out of fourteen total pages in this edition, of which the final five pages consist largely of the 1398 condemnation of magic and superstition by the Paris theological faculty). 73 At the outset of De potestate demonum (fol. 245r) he noted that all "sortilegia, incantaciones, veneficia, sompnia, diuinaciones, beneficiones, prestigia, auruspicia, ars notoria, futurorum prenosticaciones, coniuraciones, dierum obseruaciones, punctuaciones per artem nigromancie, piromancie, geomancie, et plura talia," when not mere figments of human imagination, derive from "illusiones demonum." 74 Anonymous, De superstitionibus, fols. 55v-59r, discussing explicitly demonic divination; Denis the Carthusian, Contra vitia superstitionum, pp. 613-14, discussing the same.
Bible, for example, repeatedly sanctioned the practice of exorcism, declaring that all followers of Christ had the power to cast out demons in his name. 75 This could easily be construed as entailing power to control and manipulate demons more generally. Thomas Aquinas had also stressed that there were two modes by which humans could interact with demons, either imploring and supplicating them for aid or commanding and compelling them by the power of Christ. He had judged, and fifteenth-century authors were forced to acknowledge, that the second method was entirely legitimate. 76 Such an admission was deeply troublesome because it opened a window for human interaction with demons that might not be conclusively shut again. Most authorities were quick to stress that, aside from casting out demons and driving them away, no one could ever hope to control these powerful and deceitful creatures by any kind of rite or ritual. 77 Even in cases of simple exorcism, authorities argued vigorously that demons were compelled only by divine power, not by any virtue inherent in the words or rites employed. Yet incorrect words or any improvisations could lead inadvertently to demonic supplication. Thus Nikolaus of Jauer advised people to use only psalms and official prayers, above all the Lord's Prayer, to shield themselves from demons. 78 Certainly, they should not risk any more complicated interaction with demonic forces.
Of course, not just divine and demonic power operated in the world. Earthly materials possessed natural properties, and astral bodies radiated natural energies. Some of these natural powers were obvious, but others were occult and could only be exploited by those with special knowledge. At least since the thirteenth century a category of natural magic had existed in Christian thought, which authorities deemed more or less permissible. William of Auvergne had written on this topic, as had Thomas Aquinas and his teacher Albertus Magnus. 79 Exploiting natural properties was in no way illicit or superstitious, and so in their consideration of superstition, authorities needed to take into account this added complication: what rites and seeming spells might in fact draw only on natural forces? Nikolaus of Jauer wrote that people were perfectly free to use herbs and other natural items to cure illness, heal injuries, and for other beneficial purposes. 80 Martin of Aries agreed, though because it was critical that illicit forces not creep in and corrupt 75 an otherwise natural remedy, he cautioned that people should not recite any incantations as they gathered herbs or other natural ingredients. 81 Authorities entered into particularly complex discussions concerning whether natural divination might be possible. In principle, all authorities agreed that careful observation of natural signs could be used to predict some future occurrences, but again opportunities for falling into error were plentiful. Heinrich of Gorcum, for example, noted that birds were especially sensitive to natural conditions in the air, and so their behavior could often be used to predict coming storms and other meteorological events without recourse to any kind of illicit, superstitious augury. 82 Denis the Carthusian agreed but warned that even if people observing a flight of birds avoided any illicit behavior themselves, still demons might affect the behavior of the birds in order to lead these people into error. 83 The most powerful natural forces permeating the world, and the most worrisome, were those emanating from the sun, moon, and stars. Authorities heaped attention on superstitious uses of astral forces to perform divination and other magical operations. A number of Jean Gerson's tracts dealt specifically with such astral superstition. 84 Authorities' main concern was that astral magicians might, in their rituals and ceremonies, address and propitiate stars as sentient intelligences. Thomas Aquinas had condemned this sort of astral rite, for, as he argued, the stars had no life themselves and the only intelligent entities that magicians might address through such rites were demons. 8S Similarly William of Auvergne had strongly opposed the "idolatry" of anthropomorphizing astral bodies and honoring or invoking them as if they were sentient beings. 86 Another serious concern was that astrologers might claim to predict events over which the stars exerted no natural influence, above all events that derived from human actions, for astral force could not be allowed to impinge on human free will. Yet authorities admitted that astrologers could legitimately prognosticate anything that might be caused, directly or indirectly, by astral influence. 87 This opened up a fairly wide field of action. Most directly, the power of the stars affected the atmosphere and so could influence the weather. But the stars also affected other natural processes, including some within the human body itself. Many authorities were quick to note that physicians legitimately took into account the effects of the stars on the human body when diagnosing and treating disease. 88 Because of their natural effect on the body, the stars could even create urges and "inclinations," by which many weak-willed people were fully governed, and so, in fact, the stars could be used at least to guess at some aspects of human behavior. 89 This very inexact sort of foreknowledge could never rise to the level of certain prediction because, of course, free will might always overrule the carnal impulses generated by astral forces, yet such considerations added layers of complication to authorities' judgments about astrological divination. 90 Precisely because of these complexities, many authorities cautioned against any reliance on astral rites because demons could so easily involve themselves in these murky matters. 91 The potential threat of demons operating in the natural world could be countered by the invocation of divine power. Martin of Aries had noted that people should not mutter any incantations while gathering medicinal herbs, for fear that this would invite demons into an otherwise permissible activity, but he encouraged the use of the Creed or the Lord's Prayer. 92 Yet even the invocation of divine power could be a cause for concern and confusion. Authorities stressed that official prayers and blessings, just like unofficial spells and charms, carried no power in and of themselves. If prayer and blessing were effective, this was only the result of divine power acting in response, not to a specific verbal formula, but rather to the faith that those words (ideally) conveyed. 93 To believe or to behave otherwise would be to fall into superstitious error. Only the sacraments functioned automatically, and again not because of any power that rested inherently in their formulas, but because of a "pact" consecrated between God and the church that divine power would always respond to sacramental invocation. 94 A similar threat of superstition clung to relics of saints, to images of the Virgin Mary, Christ, the cross, and even the Eucharist. Such items were worthy of reverence for what they represented (or in the case of the consecrated host, church 89 authorities asserted, for what they in fact were). 95 Yet they, too, had no inherent "virtue"; rather they served as foci through which divine power often (or always) chose to operate. 96 These were subtle distinctions, and authorities were deeply concerned that they would be lost on common people, or even some clerics, who would come to revere these items in themselves and not for what they represented. 97 Among the errors of which the Augustinian friar Werner of Friedberg stood accused in 1405, for example, was that he believed a cross in the possession of the Augustinians in Landau carried unique virtues beyond those that any cross might possess, a charge he strongly denied. 98 Had he believed this, however, he would have fallen into the same error as both clergy and laity in the village near Pamplona condemned by Martin of Aries, who believed that they could augment some power inherent in a statue of St. Peter by baptizing it and then employing it in a ceremony to bring rain. 99 Similarly, other authorities criticized people who believed that a particular image of the Virgin Mary might be "holier and more efficacious" than any other. 100 None of this was to say that faithful Christians should not use prayers or blessings or call upon the saints in times of need. The very first "case" that Heinrich of Gorcum discussed in his De superstitiosis quibusdam casibus concerned the performance of rites dedicated to St. Agatha in order to protect against fire. Heinrich concluded that these rites were entirely licit and commendable so long as people understood that it was divine power, and not any virtue inherent in the rite itself, that would provide the sought-for protection. 101 Werner of Friedberg, who was a lector in theology, though still accused of falling into error by advocating and employing superstitious rites, noted that if all blessings were illicit, the church could not advocate the blessing of ashes on Ash Wednesday, palm fronds on Palm Sunday, or eggs or meat at Easter. 102 He declared that whenever people asked his advice about particular blessings or charms, he only forbade the practices if they seemed manifestly to call on the power of the devil. 103 95 Martin of Aries, De superstitionibus, fols. 48r-50r, beginning with the question of a superstitious misuse of an image of St. Peter, has the fullest treatment of this issue. Anonymous, De latria et dulia, which follows Anonymous, De superstitionibus, in Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26923, fols. 67v-96v, and was copied in the same hand and likely at the same time, includes extensive discussions of the manner in which images of Christ, Mary, the saints, and the cross are to be venerated and worshiped (fols. 82v-92r). 96 Martin of Aries, De superstitionibus, fol. 15r-v. The Eucharist was again an exception in that it always conveyed divine power but only in the sense of bestowing grace for which it had been consecrated. Other operations-healing, warding off demons, etc.-were no more inherent to it than to any other blessed or sacral item. 97 Anonymous, De superstitionibus, fol. 28r. ' 8 Werner, Revocatio, fol. 198r. 99 Martin of Aries, De superstitionibus, opens his treatise with this case (as above, n. 56), and discusses its error fully at fols. 47v-54r. 100 Anonymous, De superstitionibus, fol. 28r: "una ymagine beate virginis certis aliis esse sanctiorem yel efficaciorem ad effectus miraculosos." 101 Heinrich of Gorcum, De superstitiosis quibusdam casibus, fols. lv-2r. 102 Werner, Revocatio, fol. 198r. See also his slightly earlier Responsio, in Lerner, "Werner di Friedberg" (above, n. 52), p. 280. 103 Werner, Revocatio, fol. 198r: "in welhem segen der tuifel nit angeruft ward die han ich nit gestraft noch verboten"; Responsio, p. 280: "et in quibus invocationibus sub vocabulo maligni spiritus non That spells, blessings, charms, and other rites not call upon the devil would certainly have been, for medieval authorities, a sine qua non of their acceptability, and Werner was rather liberal in making this his only condition. Most other authorities were more skeptical and imposed far more detailed restrictions on what practices might be permissible. Many drew up lists of specific criteria that, if met, would guarantee the licitness of given practices. These criteria could range in number between four and eight, and might vary slightly in their content (and more greatly in their expression), but all were based on conditions that Thomas Aquinas had set forth in his Summa theologiae. 104 Essential to these conditions was that the rite should contain nothing that explicitly invoked demons or the devil. There should be no unknown words or names and no "vain" symbols or written characters. Of course, no one should expect any effects to arise from the rite itself, from the "method of speaking or writing" it, but only from divine power, if God chose to respond. The point was also frequently made that rites should not aim to obtain any effects that one could not reasonably expect God to support (therefore, no evil or unjust effects). Moreover, rites should not "tempt" God by seeking an instant and automatic response. 105 Authorities basically agreed on most of the theoretical criteria for judging whether practices were legitimate or superstitious. The faithful could expel demons in Christ's name, but any attempt to command or coerce demons beyond simple exorcism would almost certainly fail. Natural forces could be exploited legitimately for any purpose to which they were naturally suited, though their potential effects were carefully circumscribed, and the danger that demons would somehow involve themselves in otherwise licit processes was ever present. Prayers and blessings could and should be used, though always with the clear understanding that they were ineffectual in and of themselves and that any results they might seem to produce actually derived solely from divine power. In each of these areas lay nuances and complexities that authorities feared would be beyond most people's comprehension and so would afford the opportunity for serious error. In this they were surely correct, for the complex conditions they had devised for parsing legitimate from illegitimate practices, definitive in the abstract, proved very confusing in practice, so much so that authorities themselves typically disagreed on the nature of any number of specific rites.
In 1405, for example, the Heidelberg theological faculty had clearly condemned a healing spell that Werner of Friedberg had advocated and even used himself, which involved reciting in the German vernacular "Christ was born, Christ was continebantur, non redarguerit neque confitentem ad desistendum a talibus non prohibuerit recitans quodammodo eas fore licitas et permissas." 104 lost, Christ was found again; may he bless these wounds, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." 106 Several decades later, however, the Zurich canon Felix Hemmerlin judged the spell to be entirely legitimate and Heidelberg's condemnation faulty. 107 Nor was this the only case in which Hemmerlin went against other authorities. He also approved of a spell to heal ailing cows that he knew other authorities had opposed. 108 The theologians of Heidelberg had similarly condemned the belief that writing the names of the Three Kings and carrying them as a charm would ward off attacks of epilepsy. 109 A few decades later in Cologne, however, Heinrich of Gorcum explicitly supported this practice, so long as people did it in reverence to God and not in the belief that the written words themselves carried power. 110 Some authorities were inclined to allow the clearly widespread practice of carrying apotropaic charms worn around the neck. 111 Others were more suspicious, however, and Nikolaus of Jauer argued in the strongest terms that while the custom was perhaps not inherently illicit, nevertheless it was highly questionable, or at least presented the possibility of serious error, and so should be avoided. 112 The limits of legitimate exorcism were especially difficult to determine. Both Martin of Aries and Felix Hemmerlin maintained that it was licit to use holy names to "exorcise" pests from fields, and in this case Hemmerlin was in agreement with 106 "Christus wart geboren Christus wart verloren Christus wart widerfunden deer gesegen dise wunden In namen des vatters und des sunes und des hailigen geistes": Werner, Revocatio, fol. 198r. See also Werner, Responsio, p. 280, in which the last clause is rendered in Latin. 107 Hemmerlin, Alius tractatus exorcismorum seu adiurationum, fol. 106v: "Et ecce audi rem proprie gestam quod de anno domini MCCCCV, die Sexta, mensis Februarii, quidam peritus frater Wernherus, lector ordinis Augustinensis, in aula episcopi Spirensis, in opido Heydelbergensis, reuocauit octo articulos tanquam erroneos, per ipsum predicatos, inter quos quartus de certis exorcismis erat talis, in forma vulgari patenter alemanico conceptus. . . . Et consequenter dixit formam unius exorcismi qui talis fuit de vulneribus curandis: Christus ward geboren, Christus ward verloren, Christus ward gefunden, der gesegnet dise wunden, in namen des vatters, etc." Analysis of this spell occupies most of this tract. Hemmerlin states (fol. 107v) that Werner was engaged in a good work, with good intention, and employed correct words. His final conclusion concerning Werner's charm, "quod tales et sui similes adiurationes seu exorcismi aut imprecationis pronunciatio licite et conuenienter admittitur, et per prelatos ecclesiarum non prohibentur," is on fol. llOv. 108 Hemmerlin, Tractatus de exorcismis, focuses on the vernacular spell "Ob das sy das Maria magt oder iungfrow eyn kindt Jesum gebar, so kumme disem thier das blatt ab, in namen des vatters, etc." (fol. 103v). He mentions other authorities who condemn the spell, although he does not indicate who they are (fol. 105r). 109 the Heidelberg theological faculty, or at least so he asserted. 113 Nikolaus of Jauer deemed that the use of crosses to ward off storms from fields was superstitious because this was not a purpose for which the church specifically intended blessed crosses to be used. 114 Heinrich of Gorcum condemned the practice as well, but mainly on the grounds that people typically believed the cross itself possessed inherent power, thereby implicitly leaving the door open for the licit use of such rites so long as proper understanding was maintained. 115 Previously in his tract Heinrich had argued that people could legitimately take consecrated or blessed items from churches and employ them for nonsacral purposes, so long as they did so with reverence and right belief. 116 Denis the Carthusian argued against this, maintaining that it was inherently irreverent to use consecrated items for purposes other than those for which they were officially intended. 117 He then raised an exception to his own point, however. Noting that holy water was officially blessed to drive away demons, he surmised that insofar as demons might be the cause of foul weather, it was licit to use holy water to protect fields at least from demonically generated storms. 118 The ever-permissive Felix Hemmerlin, discussing no less a sacral item than the Eucharist, felt it was entirely legitimate to use consecrated hosts to protect fields on all occasions. 119 With the possible exception of Hemmerlin, all early-fifteenth-century critics of superstition were deeply concerned about the potential for error that these practices held, which, if unchecked, could become a terrible corruption within Christian society. Heinrich of Gorcum, for example, noted that many people fell into superstition only out of ignorance and so might be gently corrected; but if they persisted in their error, then authorities should apply "harsher medicine." 120 Likewise Johannes of Frankfurt noted that officials should either expel or "more harshly correct" superstitious diviners or sorcerers. 121 Yet how were authorities to correct error reliably when there was so much confusion, in practice, about which rites might be permissible and which not? Typically, authors argued that officials should err on the side of caution. Denis the Carthusian asserted that even if rites were not inherently superstitious, authorities could legitimately condemn them because of the danger that they might lead people into illicit practices. 122 Johannes Nider commented that many rites that were entirely appropriate when employed by educated clerics should be forbidden to the common laity because of their lack of understanding. 123 Noting the danger of unknown names transforming prayers or blessings into demonic invocations, Martin of Aries remarked wryly that those who knew no Latin should certainly not attempt spells or blessings involving fragments of Greek. 124 Yet there was no clear consensus. In 1419 Pierre d'Ailly wrote to his former pupil Jean Gerson, not about common spells and charms, but about the equally complicated matter of learned astrology. Gerson had just written a work critical of astrology, while d'Ailly was a proponent of the art. 125 As was so typically the case when authorities confronted issues of superstition in the fifteenth century, the cardinal and the chancellor of the University of Paris actually agreed on most of the basic, theoretical distinctions between permissible astrology and its superstitious variants. Gerson had deemed astrology a "noble and admirable science" and had even cited d'Ailly several times in his tract. 126 The question was how to differentiate appropriate from erroneous astrology in practice. D'Ailly noted sardonically that just as there were certainly superstitious astrologers who went too far in their predictions, venturing into areas where the stars had no natural effect, so, too, there were "superstitious theologians" who went too far in their condemnations of these practices. 127 Superstition was a complex issue that generated considerable confusion and a multiplicity of responses among the authorities whom it concerned. Yet as d'Ailly and Gerson illustrate, differing conclusions did not necessarily lead to fundamental conflict or any obvious crisis. As one survey has noted, the fifteenth-century church generally exhibited "striking . . . forbearance" toward differing thought and expression, not so much in theory, where lines could be drawn quite sharply between the acceptable and the condemned, but rather in actual practice. 128 Authorities' anxieties about superstition and their responses to them fit this model perfectly. Despite the confusion that could surround the issue, no fifteenth-century authority ever called for a new or dramatically different approach to superstition. Rather, they all seem to have felt that traditional applications of church power, both gently to correct and more harshly to chastise, could control the problem sufficiently. Moreover, that power should be guided, they all maintained, by traditional Christian understandings of superstition stretching back for centuries. Perhaps the most "extreme" of these authors was Felix Hemmerlin, in his open assertions that most other authorities had come to faulty conclusions on this issue. 129 But his own conclusion was that those other authors were too severe and that most common spells, blessings, charms, and other rites were harmless or even positive and could easily be tolerated. 130 If there was a crisis brewing in his day, he does not seem to have been its harbinger.
THE CONTEXT OF CONCERN
Fifteenth-century authorities viewed the perceived prevalence of superstition in their day as a serious concern, but that concern does not appear to have risen to the level of a crisis, either in the sense of clearly demonstrating the exhaustion and imminent collapse of old forms of thought and practice or in the sense of demanding the development of new and innovative responses. Yet might we see this flowering of concern over superstition as an element of crisis, even if they did not? There are good reasons to argue that a true crisis is impossible without at least some contemporary recognition of the event, that some level of "crisis mentality" must grip the contemporary imagination. 131 But perhaps with historical hindsight we may recognize, where contemporaries did not, that the growing anxiety about superstition in the early fifteenth century was an aspect of other developments that they, or we, might regard as crises. 132 As I have argued elsewhere, one context in which concern over superstition clearly developed in this period was among new universities being founded across Europe and especially in the lands of the German empire. 133 Influenced by Gerson, working in the old intellectual center of Paris, members of the new theological faculties that dotted the central European landscape increasingly wrote shorter, more focused works that addressed practical problems rather than sweeping abstractions. 134 They also tended to address matters of everyday piety and pastoral care, exemplifying the new trend toward Frommigkeitstheologie in this period, again influenced by Gerson but dominant in German lands. 135 Each of these trends favored renewed attention to the old issue of potential superstition in common beliefs and practices. Particularly from the leading central European universities at Prague and Vienna, networks of theologians interested in superstition radiated out to other, even newer institutions across the empire. 136 The newer universities founded in the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries were often the creations of regional princes and were expected to serve the needs of secular government. 137 Theological faculties were therefore supposed to play a role in promoting right belief and sound piety. Policing potential superstition was one aspect of this duty. The case of Werner of Friedberg is exemplary. His advocacy of common spells and charms for healing and other simple needs not only threatened to undermine proper religion in the region of Landau but also challenged the authority of local clergy who were forbidding certain spells that Werner approved. 138 As Werner had theological training, he was able to justify himself under initial questioning at the local bishop's court with some skill. 139 Now, however, theologians from the region's new university at Heidelberg, founded only twenty years earlier, could be brought in to refute his positions.
Some scholars have seen this multiplication of intellectual centers in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as itself constituting a crisis, contributing to intellectual discord in western Europe. Certainly it was a negative development from the perspective of the traditional intellectual center in Paris, which (insofar as it noticed at all) now saw its authority challenged. 140 But such gloomy perceptions hardly applied to the new foundations themselves, brimming with energy and possibilities. The mood in Vienna in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, for example, has been described by one scholar as "buoyant." 141 These new centers of intellectual activity promoted a diversity of opinion, perhaps reflected, to some extent, in the confusion and disagreements that surrounded the issue of superstition. 142 But this diversity did not lead to any evident crisis. Again it must be stressed that despite the difficulties superstition presented, authorities appear to have remained confident in the church's ability to address the problem in traditional ways.
The persistence of superstition into the fifteenth century might be taken as a sign of failure on the part of the church in its ancient efforts to Christianize the peoples of Europe. 143 In their appropriations of late-antique Christian criticism of superstition, fifteenth-century authors sometimes did refer to superstitious practices as remnants of paganism. 144 Yet they also recognized the vast distance between their own and ancient days, 145 and they realized that the practices they condemned were essentially Christian. Indeed, this was the main reason for their concern. As one author stated explicitly, the superstitious spells and charms they criticized were far worse than the erroneous rites of the Jews precisely because such spells were corruptions of Christian practice. 146 Certainly superstition entailed "popular" practices and "folkloric" beliefs that could be quite different from the religious culture of clerical elites. 147 But more often people of all social statuses based the spells, blessings, and charms they employed on elements of the liturgy or other official rites. 148 Thus in their efforts to correct and improve Christian practice, critics of superstition were among the many voices calling for religious reform in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 149 Calls for reform are often taken to imply a crisis, or at least a decline. 150 Yet we must be cautious about using some generalized idea of reformist concerns to deduce a generalized crisis in this period. In fact, many varieties of reform developed during these years, and distinct trends should not be casually lumped together. 151 Critics of superstition belong to the trend that I have elsewhere called "spiritual reform," and reformers of this variety sought to improve personal piety and to correct individual belief and practice. 152 As Jean Gerson argued, the faithful should turn to God, not superstition, in times of need and should "amend their lives." 153 Notably, reformers of this sort did not seek a technical reformatio in the sense of a return to some supposed earlier, more perfect state of humanity or the church (unless that state should have been before the Fall). As such, while they certainly stressed the deformations of present days, they did not, at least in their tracts and treatises on superstition, valorize the past as other varieties of reformist writing sometimes did, thereby generating an artificial sense of crisis. 154 This is not to imply that these men were unimpressed by the achievements of earlier times. Gerson, for example, exhibited great admiration for the accomplishments of thirteenth-and early-fourteenth-century thinkers in his program for intellectual reform. 155 Yet their critiques of superstition do not fixate on any lost age of superior virtue and so do not present an image of a contemporary society fallen into deep crisis.
The whole "crisis model" of understanding the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has come under considerable criticism itself, as have evocative notions of the era's waning, decline, or even its very "lateness." 156 Such descriptions of this period stem at least as much from late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century ideas of historical progression, and that era's own fin-de-siecle concerns, as from any fourteenth-or fifteenth-century reality. 157 This is particularly true when our focus falls only on the fifteenth century, as even partisans of the crisis model are increasingly restricting it to the troubled 1300s. 158 They also frequently argue that the concept of crisis must be understood in terms not only of exhaustion, waning, or collapse but also of energetic breakthroughs and progressive new developments. 159 In this, they seem to approach the arguments of those opponents of the crisis model who characterize the supposed late Middle Ages, and particularly the fifteenth century, in terms of multiplicity of forms, forces, and tendencies, incapable of reduction to any simple synthesis. 160 Confusion over how to identify and respond to superstition would fit the general paradigm of fifteenth-century diversity and complicated coexistence of various practices and beliefs, at least until the midto-late-1400s, when a harsh new synthesis began to emerge in the form of demonic witchcraft. Yet even here one must be careful to note that early theories of witchcraft were far from uniform or monolithic. 161 Moreover, throughout the fifteenth century even the harshest opponents of witchcraft remained ambivalent on the matter of simple superstitious spells and charms. 162 Even the next century, with its profound religious upheavals, brought little fundamental change to thought about superstition. The Reformation certainly added new dimensions to the concern, with different confessions now accusing one another of enshrining foul superstition in their theology, in addition to everintensifying efforts to correct and control common practices. Yet authoritative thought on superstition did not take on any particularly new character or tone, remaining essentially grounded in medieval and early Christian conceptions even as it reflected the changing context of its own time. 163 Moreover, within the nowvarious confessions of Western Christianity, authoritative policing of the complicated "twilight zone" of common spells and charms continued much as in the fifteenth century. 164 It was not in the fifteenth or sixteenth century but rather in the eighteenth that authorities' approaches to superstition underwent fundamental change, as Enlightenment thinkers dramatically recast superstition as an error against new models of scientific rationality rather than against traditional religious doctrine. 165 Instead of supporting the notion of a crisis-ridden or waning latemedieval period that came to a calamitous end around 1500, the issue of superstition instead fits more easily into the model of an Old Europe of beliefs and mentalities that endured until the 1700s. 166 "Old Europe" is typically defined as stretching from the twelfth or even eleventh century through the eighteenth and is usually discussed in terms of political and economic structures. 167 Yet as one scholar has noted, "human mentalities have their persistencies just as much as demographic patterns, field systems, and trade routes do." 168 Indeed, mentalities may be the most persistent of those structures. The conceptions of superstition that underwent dramatic change in the eighteenth century did not first emerge in the eleventh or twelfth. Authors in the fifteenth century knew the practices they confronted were not identical to those of ancient days, but they understood those practices in terms that had been developed in the tenth century, the seventh, the fifth, or even earlier. 169 Rather than just an Old Europe of six or seven hundred years, here we can see a world of traditional Christianity enduring some fifteen centuries. 170 Yet there are also more recent breaks in the history of superstition. As much as they drew on patristic and early-medieval authorities, the authors of the fifteenth century were also grounded in, and reacted to, theological developments in the twelfth and above all the thirteenth centuries. The need to make traditional Christian understandings of demonic power cohere with Aristotelian philosophy, and the problems of definition and discernment that ensued as aspects of that coherence were worked out, lies at the core of many of the practical problems of identifying and regulating superstition that authorities encountered in the fifteenth century. 171 Their engagement with and criticism of this topic came at the midpoint (perhaps a climactic midpoint) in Old European mentalities, or in a later phase of traditional Christian mentalities, that endured for several more centuries. 172 Their concerns provide a vital window into the dynamic religious and intellectual world of the fifteenth century; they do not, however, represent an autumnal end phase or crisis of a late or waning Middle Ages.
